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Abstract
Following the chaotic Copenhagen conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
policymakers and pundits have discussed the G-20 as an alternative forum for advancing climate change diplomacy.  
This paper assesses the risks and rewards of tackling climate change in the G-20 and finds that despite its seeming attrac-
tiveness, the G-20, as structured, is not a suitable replacement for the UN-led process and has limited ability, at present, 
to advance climate change negotiations. There is much, however, that the G-20 can do to contribute to the goals of the 
climate negotiations outside of wading into the negotiations themselves. Building on its existing agenda the G-20 has 
the power to significantly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, accelerate the deployment of clean energy technology, 
and help vulnerable countries adapt to a warmer world through the mobilization of public and private finance. Following 
through on the existing G-20 pledge to phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, establishing new green 
guidelines for multilateral development banks, coordinating green stimulus exit strategies, promoting open markets for 
environmental goods and services, and rebalancing global economic growth all fall well within the G-20’s mandate and 
help meet the climate challenge.
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IntroductIon
The chaos of the December 2009 climate change negotiations in Copenhagen have left many in the 
international environmental community searching for a new strategy, and new forum, to advance climate 
change cooperation. The current United Nations (UN) process, charged with implementing the 1994 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has made little formal progress since 
launching the current round of negotiations in 2007. The UNFCCC’s requirement for consensus between 
all 194 parties to make even routine procedural decisions and sharp differences in the core positions of 
member countries resulted in a negotiating stalemate for the two years leading up to the 15th UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen. 
The modest Copenhagen Accord, cobbled together by a group of key leaders in the final hours of 
the conference, could not garner unanimous support and thus exists as a voluntary agreement with no 
legal standing under the UNFCCC. Many parties and observers left the conference wondering whether 
the UNFCCC process can ever deliver a meaningful international solution to climate change if any one 
state, no matter how small, has the ability to block. Wouldn’t it make more sense to hammer out an 
agreement among a select group of large countries, such as the Group of Twenty (G-20)? 
The question comes at a critical time in the G-20’s evolution. Though in existence since 1999, the 
G-20 became the premier international economic forum only in 2008 in response to the global financial 
crisis. As global growth gets back on track, the G-20’s challenge is transitioning from a crisis responder to 
a systemic manager. This will inevitably broaden the G-20 agenda, and leaders will need to identify issues 
where the forum can be of particular use and avoid issues the group is poorly suited to address.  
This working paper assesses the potential risks and rewards of tackling climate change in the G-20 
and finds that despite its seeming attractiveness as an alternative venue for climate change diplomacy, 
the G-20, as structured, is not a suitable replacement for the UN-led process and has limited ability, 
at present, to advance climate change negotiations. At the same time, significant progress in reducing 
emissions can be achieved directly through existing elements of the G-20 agenda, and the group has the 
potential to play a pivotal role in advancing international climate change cooperation down the road. 
WhAt’s holdIng up InternAtIonAl clImAte tAlks?
The outcome of the Copenhagen COP surprised many observers given the positive domestic policy 
movement in key countries in the run-up to the summit. A change of government in Australia, Japan, 
and the United States brought about more ambitious emissions reduction targets in all three countries. 
Large emerging economies, including People’s Rep. of China (China), India, Brazil, South Africa, and 
Indonesia, all announced nationwide emissions reduction goals for the first time ever and began imple-
menting domestic policy to achieve these targets. And bilateral meetings between large emitters, as well 3
as the Major Economies Forum leaders’ meeting in July 2009, produced communiqués highlighting the 
importance of international cooperation on climate change (Houser 2010). 
The problem came in translating unilateral domestic action and bilateral and plurilateral 
pronouncements into a tangible multilateral agreement. The 1994 UNFCCC categorizes countries into 
“developed” (those listed in Annex I of the treaty) and “developing” (those not listed in Annex I) based on 
their economic status when the treaty was negotiated. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol solidified this distinction, 
mandating emissions cuts for Annex I countries only. This asymmetry precluded ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by the United States. The US Congress made clear in the run-up to the Kyoto summit 
that they would only accept a climate treaty in which large emerging economies committed to reducing 
emissions alongside developed countries, though the nature and ambition of those reductions could be 
differentiated based on capability.1 As the Kyoto Protocol failed this test, it was never ratified 
in Washington.
Without the United States on board, participation in the Kyoto Protocol has become increasingly 
politically unacceptable for other developed counties. And given the rapid growth in emissions from 
emerging economies since 1997, the Protocol is inadequate to limit global temperature increases to  
2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, which the scientific community believes is critical to avoid the 
worst effects of climate change. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol provides only limited financing for adaptation, 
an important issue for the poorest and most vulnerable developing countries. As a result, when the 
parties to the UNFCCC met in Bali in 2007 they endeavored to negotiate more than a simple extension 
of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its initial 2007–12 commitment period. The Bali Action Plan launched 
a “comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012” (UNFCCC 2007).  The Bali Action 
Plan envisioned an “agreed outcome” in Copenhagen that would include mitigation commitments or 
actions by both developed and developing countries, provisions for the measurement, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) of these commitments or actions, efforts to reduce deforestation, cooperation on 
technology, and financial support for both adaptation and mitigation. 
The parties left Bali with strong differences of opinion on how each of these issues should be 
addressed. And the term “agreed outcome” glossed over sharp disagreement on what legal form such an 
“outcome” should take. While some progress was made on technology and deforestation between Bali and 
Copenhagen, there was little, or even backward, movement on other issues. The sharpest disagreement 
centered around the following:
Legal Form: While recognizing that countries’ mitigation commitments will vary given their level 
of economic development, the United States’ position is that those commitments should be legally 
1. Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S. Res. 98), United States Senate, July 1997.4
symmetric for all major emitters—i.e., if developed countries make their domestic commitments legally 
binding under a future climate treaty, emerging economies must too. Emerging economies argue that the 
UNFCCC assigns greater responsibility in addressing climate change to developed countries and that this 
should translate into the legal form, as well as substantive content, of emissions reduction actions. 
Most developing countries envisioned a Copenhagen outcome made up of two agreements: an 
extension of the Kyoto Protocol commitments for developed countries other than the United States and a 
new agreement in which the United States takes on legally binding commitments but developing-country 
mitigation actions are strictly voluntary.  This position is highly problematic for the European Union and 
other Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol, who would like to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a single 
agreement that includes the United States. 
Transparency: Parties also disagree about whose mitigation actions can be measured, reported, and 
verified by the international community. Developed countries read the Bali Action Plan as requiring 
MRV for all mitigation actions listed in an agreement. Developing countries, by and large, hold the view 
that MRV applies only to developed-country commitments and those actions by developing countries 
supported by finance or technology from developed countries. 
Finance: Countries particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change, such as island states, are an 
important constituency in the climate negotiations. As such, financial support for both mitigation and 
adaptation is a key component of any agreement. Parties have wide-ranging views on the appropriate 
levels, sources, and governance of climate-related finance. 
Disagreement on these three issues, coupled with a UN process that requires consensus between all 
194 parties, prevented any meaningful progress in negotiations leading up to Copenhagen or during the 
first week of the summit. The UN and the Danish chair attempted to broker a compromise by convening 
heads of state from a small and representative group of developed countries  (Japan, Canada, Australia, 
the United States, Russia, and several European states), large developing countries (China, India, Brazil, 
Mexico, and South Africa), representatives of vulnerable country groups (Grenada and the Maldives 
on behalf of island states, Lesotho and Bangladesh on behalf of least developed countries [LDCs], and 
Algeria and Ethiopia on behalf of Africa), and several others. This collection of roughly 30 leaders (or 
deputies in the case of a few countries) negotiated the five-page Copenhagen Accord, which was able to 
reach a compromise on issues of transparency and finance by sidestepping the question of legal form. 
The Copenhagen Accord was drafted as a nonbinding agreement not intended to serve as the “agreed 
outcome” called for in the Bali Action Plan.  The Accord endorses a continuation of the negotiations 
launched in Bali and remains silent on whether the terms agreed to in the Accord should be carried over 
into a future legally binding agreement.  5
Despite its nonbinding nature, and the fact that countries that participated in the drafting of the 
Accord account for the majority of global emissions and population, six states—Sudan, Venezuela, Cuba, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Tuvalu—opposed the Accord when it was presented to the full 194-member 
COP, leaving it with no formal standing within the UNFCCC. 
Within two months of the Copenhagen conference, 106 countries accounting for 81 percent 
of global emissions and 76 percent of global population “signed up” to the Accord, with 72 countries 
voluntarily listing emissions reduction pledges in the agreement’s appendices. These numbers have 
continued to grow.2  Yet the UN negotiations remain bogged down over the same issues of legal form, 
transparency, and finance that stalled talks before Copenhagen.
the lure of the g-20 As An AlternAtIve forum
In the nine months since the Copenhagen conference, the G-20 has been repeatedly floated, both by 
policymakers and pundits, as a possible alternative to the existing UN-led process for advancing climate 
change cooperation.3 A number of attributes make the G-20 a seemingly attractive venue for climate 
change diplomacy. 
membership
In contrast to the UNFCCC, where all 194 parties have equal voice regardless of size and consensus among 
the full group is required to take action, the G-20’s exclusive membership allows for more efficient decision-
making. Any action by G-20 countries, which alone account for over 75 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, could keep global temperature increases to less than 2 degrees Celsius, at least for the next several 
decades (Table 1). All G-20 members, except Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have “signed up” to the Copenhagen 
Accord and voluntarily inscribed national emissions reduction (mitigation) targets in the Accord’s appen-
dices. And G-20 country inscriptions account for the vast majority of the Accord’s mitigation potential.
format
The UN negotiations are aimed at producing a legally binding climate change treaty. Sharp disagreement 
over what legal obligations are appropriate for which countries under such a treaty is a large part of 
why the negotiations have floundered. The Copenhagen Accord demonstrated that it’s possible to reach 
agreement on substance in a nonbinding deal. The less formal nature of the G-20 could help advance 
2. For a list of countries currently associated with the Copenhagen Accord, see “Who's On Board with the Copenhagen 
Accord?”available at www.usclimatenetwork.org.. 
3. See, for example, the European Council’s March 2010 conclusions, available at www.consilium.europa.eu, and Joshua 
W. Busby, “After Copenhagen: Climate Governance and the Road Ahead” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2010).6
international climate cooperation on a voluntary basis, building on the Copenhagen Accord, until a 
new legally binding agreement is politically possible. This would help prevent UNFCCC acrimony from 
hindering efforts to turn fairly positive developments in the domestic policy of most G-20 countries into 
international cooperation and trust.
expertise
Built on top of a finance ministers’ process, the G-20 has considerable capacity and expertise when it 
comes to questions of climate finance, a key pillar of the negotiations. G-20 countries also provide the 
vast majority of both financial aid and foreign direct investment to developing countries at present and 
will likely continue to do so under any future climate finance regime. Whether identifying potential 
sources of public financial support for mitigation and adaptation, establishing new international funds, or 
developing mechanisms to incentivize private investment in developing countries, the G-20 could play an 
important substantive role. 
level and scope 
The Copenhagen COP was unique in the number of leaders in attendance. Future COPs are unlikely to 
have heads of state participation. And while the Major Economies Forum held a leaders’ meeting in 2009, 
it’s unlikely to do so again. As a result, the G-20, self-identified as the “premier forum” for international 
economic cooperation, will likely be the only ongoing plurilateral leaders’ process with both developed 
and developing countries at the table and a mandate that could extend to climate change. The core issues 
at play in the climate negotiations will ultimately need leaders’ attention to unlock (as was the case with 
the Copenhagen Accord) and the G-20 could be instrumental in that process. In addition, addressing 
climate change alongside other G-20 agenda items potentially opens up new pathways to a deal not 
possible in the more narrowly focused UNFCCC setting.  
the chAllenges And rIsks of puttIng clImAte on the g-20 AgendA
While attractive on many levels, the G-20 also has some significant shortcomings as a forum for 
addressing climate change. Though the group accounts for the majority of global emissions, it excludes 
countries most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. None of the 49 countries the UN categorizes 
as LDCs or the 39 countries that negotiate collectively in the UN as the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) has a seat at the table and only one African country (South Africa) is represented. LDCs, AOSIS, 
and the African Group are critical constituencies in climate negotiations, and any deal struck in their 
absence may lack credibility and be criticized by those outside the G-20 umbrella. This is particularly true 
on issues of climate finance as these groups will likely receive the lion’s share of future financial flows.  7
To tackle the negotiations directly, the G-20 would first need to establish a G-20+ process for 
climate change that included representatives from vulnerable country groupings. The G-20 would also 
need to approach the negotiating agenda in a balanced manner. The Copenhagen Accord addressed 
all four of the negotiations: mitigation (including transparency and forestry), finance, adaptation, 
and technology.  In particular, it was the balanced treatment of transparency (important to developed 
countries) and finance (important to developing countries) that made the Accord possible. Advancing one 
of these issues through the G-20 but not the other risks weakening the prospects of a comprehensive deal.
But the right group of countries and right approach to the negotiating agenda won’t, in and of 
itself, deliver a climate change agreement. The fact that six countries—Sudan, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Tuvalu—were able to prevent the 194-member COP from adopting the Copenhagen 
Accord left many with the impression that the principal impediments to progress in UNFCCC 
negotiations are the number of actors and the need for consensus. In fact it’s the fundamental differences 
in the negotiating positions of G-20 countries themselves that lie at the core of the current UNFCCC 
stalemate.  While G-20 countries were instrumental in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, opinions within 
the group vary as to the agreement’s importance. Some countries see it both as an operational agreement 
in and of itself and as a template for a future binding agreement. For example, in its first submission to 
the UNFCCC following the Copenhagen summit, the United States stated, “the Copenhagen Accord is 
expressly operational and calls for work to be carried out in a number of areas that should be launched 
without delay. At the same time, we would welcome a further formalization of the Accord in Mexico” 
(UNFCCC 2010). 
Others see it more as a political declaration, pieces of which can be incorporated into the existing 
UNFCCC negotiations on an ad hoc basis. China, for example, submitted to the UNFCCC that “the 
political agreement in the Copenhagen Accord may be considered and where appropriate, be translated 
into texts that can be incorporated in the negotiating text” (UNFCCC 2010). 
And some G-20 countries not included in the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord reject its validity 
as a document. Saudi Arabia, for example, has stated that “since the ‘Copenhagen Accord has not been 
formally adopted, it has no legal status within the UNFCCC, and thus can’t be used as basis or reference 
for further negotiations” (UNFCCC 2010). 
As a result, there is significant risk that marrying climate change and the G-20 will end up 
introducing the acrimony of the UN negotiations into G-20 discussions rather than bringing the civility 
of the G-20 to climate change diplomacy.  This is a risk worth taking to unlock the climate talks, as only 
a leaders’ process can do, when conditions are ripe for a deal. But a premature foray into the negotiations 
could weaken the G-20’s status and hamper progress on other critical issues on the group’s agenda.     8
the rIght tIme for the g-20 to WAde Into the clImAte debAte 
In the months since Copenhagen, countries’ negotiating positions have progressed little and in some cases 
even hardened. While the Copenhagen Accord salvaged what would have otherwise been a complete 
failure of a conference, the way it was negotiated—by a select group of countries convened by a chair 
(Denmark) seen by many parties as biased—has created an environment of distrust in the UNFCCC 
setting. Many developing countries involved in drafting the Accord have sought to downplay its impor-
tance and maintained a hard-line position in the UNFCCC talks. And domestic policy momentum 
in many developed countries has stalled or reversed, raising doubts about whether they will be able to 
fulfill their Copenhagen Accord commitments.4 Finally, core questions sidestepped in the Copenhagen 
Accord—whether the Kyoto Protocol continues or is replaced with a new treaty and who would be legally 
bound under such a new agreement—remain entirely unresolved. 
At present the best case scenario for the upcoming 16th COP in Cancún is a set of very modest 
decisions laying the groundwork for a future agreement. This could include a set of guidelines for the new 
climate fund called for in the Copenhagen Accord, guidelines for developing countries for reporting their 
emissions and mitigation actions, and progress on forestry and technology cooperation. There is little 
value in asking leaders to push these low-level issues. Doing so would diminish the G-20’s stature and 
ultimately prove fruitless if the broader disputes over the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and form of a new 
agreement end up preventing any tangible progress in Cancún, which is entirely possible. And given the 
current negotiating positions of the G-20’s developing-country members and the state of domestic policy 
in developed-country members, the chances of a G-20–facilitated breakthrough on the broader issues are 
vanishingly small.  
That said G-20 countries will be expected to at least touch on climate change during their 
November meeting in Seoul, which is about three weeks before the 16th COP in Cancún. The leaders 
should include time on the agenda for a frank discussion of the state of the negotiations and room in the 
communiqué for a paragraph calibrating public expectations for Cancún’s outcome. There is also plenty of 
scope for leaders to use the existing G-20 agenda to make tangible progress in reducing global emissions, 
accelerating the deployment of clean energy technology, and mobilizing public and private finance for 
mitigation and adaptation, all in a way that sidesteps the politics of the negotiations. Five areas deserve 
particular attention and support.   
4. Most notable is the United States, where in the run-up to Copenhagen the House of Representatives had passed 
economy-wide climate change legislation and the Senate was poised to do the same. As of September 2010, the Senate 
had abandoned work on an economy-wide bill due to unified Republican opposition, as well as a number of moderate 
Democrats as a result of persistent US economic weakness, increased public skepticism in climate change science and the 
November 2010 Congressional elections.9
fossIl fuel subsIdIes
In Pittsburgh, G-20 countries agreed to “phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil 
fuel subsidies” (G-20 2009b). In Toronto, G-20 energy and finance ministers presented their plans for 
fulfilling this pledge. While encouraging, the reports highlighted how much work remains for the G-20 in 
this area (G-20 2010a).  
A joint report prepared by the International Energy Agency, Oil and Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and World Bank (IEA,  
OPEC, OECD, and World Bank 2010) for the G-20 ahead of the Toronto meeting estimates that nearly 
$557 billion worth of fossil fuel consumption subsidies exist globally and that eliminating them would 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 6.9 percent in 2020 compared with business as usual. By comparison, 
the Copenhagen Accord mitigation commitments would reduce global emissions by 7 to 13 percent 
below business as usual (Houser 2010). And the OECD estimates the benefits of subsidy elimination 
would grow to a 10 percent reduction in global emissions below business as usual by 2050 (OECD 2009, 
2010). In addition, the Global Subsidies Initiative estimates that an additional $100 billion in fossil fuel 
subsidies exist on the producer side, the phase out of which would deliver additional emissions reduction 
gains (GSI 2009). 
G-20 countries account for just under half of the IEA’s estimate of fossil fuel consumption subsidies 
globally (IEA 2010a). In Toronto, twelve G-20 countries offered strategies and timetables for rationalizing 
and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, but only three countries included plans for consumption subsidies 
specifically: Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico (Table 2). These three, while important sources of 
consumption subsidies based on the IEA’s price-gap analysis, account for only 24 percent of total G-20 
consumption subsidies. In addition, their implementation strategies were limited to a subset of the total 
subsidies identified by the IEA. For example, Argentina pledged to phase out liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) subsidies as natural gas becomes more readily available, but the IEA estimates that natural gas 
accounts for more than half of Argentina’s consumption subsidies. 
India, which accounts for 17 percent of the IEA’s estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has 
established an Eminent Group of Ministers to recommend a strategy for rationalizing and phasing out 
inefficient petroleum consumption subsidies. India will presumably report to the G-20 once the strategy 
is developed, though Delhi has indicated that kerosene and LPG subsidies may not be covered. 
Russia, which accounts for 20 percent of the IEA’s estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has said 
that inefficient fossil fuel subsidies will be rationalized and phased out as part of its Energy Strategy 2030 
and Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic Development till 2020 but hasn’t provided any specifics.   
China, which accounts for 17 percent of the IEA’s estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has 
neither identified any domestic consumption subsidies nor offered a plan for phasing them out. Saudi 10
Arabia and South Africa, which account for the remaining 22 percent of the IEA’s estimate, have stated 
that they do not have any consumption subsidies. 
For developed countries, fossil fuel subsidies generally exist on the production rather than 
consumption side. Estimates of the scale of production subsidies are much thinner than consumption 
subsidies. The Global Subsidies Initiative’s estimate of $100 billion is based on disparate country studies 
with varying methodologies (GSI 2009). The majority of production subsidies likely exist in developed 
countries. EarthWatch estimated that in 2003, US producer subsidies totaled $37 billion to $64 billion. 
Greenpeace estimated that in the late 1990s, EU production subsidies were greater than $10 billion  
per year. 
Among developed G-20 countries, Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom denied the 
existence of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in their countries, either on the consumption or production 
side. Canada, Germany, Italy, Korea, Russia, Turkey, and the United States all offered rationalization and 
phaseout plans for production subsidies of varying scope, ambition, and specificity.  China also pledged to 
phase out one fossil fuel subsidy on the production side. 
recommendation 
The disconnect between the IEA’s estimate of the scale of global fossil fuel subsidies and the extent of 
current G-20 country plans for their rationalization and phaseout highlights just how much work the 
G-20 must still do to turn the Pittsburgh pledge into meaningful action. First, G-20 countries must 
close the gap in their respective definitions of what constitutes an “inefficient fossil fuel subsidy.” On 
the consumption side, several G-20 countries disagree with the IEA’s price-gap analysis, which compares 
domestic prices (controlled to transportation costs) to “international prices” and ascribes the difference to 
subsidization even if no direct fiscal transfer to the consumers or companies in question can be identified. 
This disagreement was highlighted in the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010) joint report and 
explains why Saudi Arabia denies the existence of domestic fossil fuel subsidies, while the IEA estimates 
$49 billion worth of Saudi subsidies in 2008.   
The IEA estimates cover all subsidies, not just “inefficient” subsidies, which is the focus of the G-20 
goal. Considerable work must also be done to develop a common definition and robust assessment of 
fossil fuel production subsidies, as these are more important for the G-20’s developed-country members.  
The mandate of the G-20 Energy Experts Group should be extended and expanded to attempt 
to address these definitional issues so that G-20 members can put forward a qualitative inventory of 
domestic subsidy policies that’s consistent with quantitative assessments of the extent of subsidies in 
those countries.  Only with commonly agreed definitions will the G-20 be able to monitor progress of 11
individual members in implementing their domestic strategies and assess the progress of the group in 
meeting its collective target.
In addition to tracking countries’ domestic subsidy strategies, the G-20 should identify sectors 
where coordinated international action will allow for greater domestic ambition. For example, attempts 
to phase out subsidies to oil and gas producers in country X will likely face domestic resistance out of 
concerns that doing so unilaterally will only push production to other countries, making country X 
more dependent on imported oil. Coordinated action between G-20 countries would help address these 
concerns. 
reform of InternAtIonAl fInAncIAl InstItutIons
At the moment, most multilateral climate finance flows through the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs). Increasing MDB resources and reforming MDB governance have been mainstays of the G-20 
agenda, in part because of the increased prominence of issues like climate change.  In London, leaders 
pledged to “make the transition towards clean, innovative, resource efficient, low carbon technologies 
and infrastructure” and called upon the MDBs to “contribute fully to the achievement of this objective” 
(G-20 2009a).
Many MDBs have established specific funds to address climate change, but these account for a 
relatively small share of the overall MDB energy-related lending. For example, donor countries have 
committed a total of $6.1 billion to capitalize the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds. Yet in 2009 
alone, World Bank lending in climate-related sectors such as energy, water, agriculture, mining, and 
transportation totaled $20 billion (World Bank 2010). When it comes to the rest of the MDB’s energy 
portfolio, the views of board members differ considerably on what type of climate-related criteria to apply. 
This often results in highly contentious public disputes over whether the MDBs should fund specific 
projects given their environmental profile, rather than MDB staff receiving clear blanket guidance from 
their boards on which types of projects are acceptable and which aren’t. 
recommendations
As part of the G-20’s broader effort to modernize MDB governance, the group could play a useful role 
in establishing a more consistent framework for energy and environmental lending to avoid contentious 
and public debate on each project. The World Bank is currently developing a new Energy Strategy and 
Environment Strategy, both of which are intended to be completed in time for the Bank’s spring 2011 
board meeting. The G-20 could help advance this process during the Seoul summit and ensure that the 
group’s call for a greater MDB role in combating climate change is translated into action.    12
exItIng stImulus
Coordinated fiscal expansion in the face of the worst economic crisis in a generation is perhaps the G-20’s 
most important achievement thus far. And with energy and environmental issues gaining prominence on 
the domestic policy agendas in most G-20 countries, leaders pledged at the London summit to “make 
the best possible use of investment funded by fiscal stimulus programmes towards the goal of building 
a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery” (G-20 2009a). The bank HSBC estimates that 16 percent 
of G-20 countries’ 2009 and 2010 stimulus spending went to climate-friendly projects (Table 3). This 
funding has been the dominant driver of domestic energy and climate policy in G-20 countries over the 
past two years and has pushed global clean energy research and development budgets to historic highs 
in 2009 after three decades of steady decline (Figure 1). As the G-20 turns its attention to fiscal consoli-
dation, the global energy and environmental policy landscape will change considerably. 
recommendation
As the G-20 discusses when and how to end the current fiscal expansion, special attention should be paid 
to energy and environmental spending. The G-20 has highlighted the importance of policy coordination 
as countries roll back stimulus programs. This is doubly true for climate-related stimulus programs. Clean 
energy is a global market, and firms will be able to achieve greater cost reductions if the largest markets 
(G-20 countries) can help provide economies of scale through policy coordination. And clean energy 
research dollars can go farther when programmed relative to what other large countries are doing. As a 
result, a coordinated transition from stimulus-driven energy and climate investment to long-term energy 
and climate policy will provide greater energy security, emissions reduction, and energy cost savings 
benefits than disparate action. 
The G-20 has asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) to review member countries’ exit strategies and provide recommendations for coordination. A 
complementary process should be set up for energy and environmental stimulus spending. Countries 
should provide reports in Seoul on the outlook for domestic climate-related public investment, 
particularly in research and development, given their respective plans for fiscal consolidation. The 
G-20 should then task the newly formed Clean Energy Ministerial (which includes all G-20 countries 
save Turkey and Saudi Arabia), working in consultation with the IMF and the IEA, with developing 
recommendations for policy coordination in time for the 2011 summit. This effort could be coordinated 
through the G-20’s Energy Experts Group. 
open mArkets 
One of the principal G-20 objectives following the global financial crisis was to guard against protec-
tionism and support international trade and open markets. In Washington in 2008, leaders underscored 13
the “critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncer-
tainty” and pledged to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, 
imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent 
measures to stimulate exports” during the following 12 months (G-20 2008).  
Fiscal expansion in G-20 countries following the Washington summit, however, was accompanied 
by a suite of trade policies that violated this pledge, not least in the energy and environmental space.  The 
financial crisis coupled with growing public skepticism in several countries about the science of climate 
change has made industrial policy and job creation more important political drivers of clean energy 
deployment in most parts of the world than energy security or environmental concerns. As a result, there 
is strong political pressure in many countries to ensure that taxpayer funding for clean energy deployment 
goes exclusively to domestic clean technology companies. And while discriminatory trade policies tied to 
stimulus dollars will fade as countries transition to fiscal consolidation, this emerging “space race” framing 
of the energy and climate challenge will ensure that protectionism will remain an issue in energy and 
climate policymaking for years to come. 
Poorly managed, this trend could raise the cost of clean energy technology for all countries and 
hamper efforts to address climate change. Globalization of clean energy supply chains has the potential 
to significantly reduce technology costs, which in turn will mitigate the economic impact of a transition 
to a low-carbon economy. But concern over jobs losses in the clean energy products and services where 
individual countries are not competitive and uncertainty about foreign markets for the products and 
services in which they are many governments opting for a strategy of home-market protection, which 
results in either higher energy prices or lower levels of clean energy deployment. Making open markets 
consistent with countries’ domestic clean energy-related economic and employment goals requires a new 
framework for international trade and investment in the energy and environmental space.  
recommendation
In Seoul, the G-20 should set out to develop a Green Trade and Investment Framework (GTIF). Such a 
framework would cover a full and balanced set of energy- and environment-related trade and investment 
issues in G-20 countries to create a level playing field in the development and deployment of affordable 
climate-friendly technology, including 
n  tariff barriers,
n  clean energy technology production subsidies,
n  local content requirements,
n  intellectual property rights enforcement,
n  codes and standards, and
n  foreign investment approvals.14
Many of these issues are currently being addressed in other forums, including the Doha Round. 
The GTIF would not replace these processes but rather be a nonbinding framework guiding the domestic 
policy of G-20 countries, which account for the majority of clean energy producers and consumers. 
bAlAnced groWth 
In Washington, the G-20 identified global economic imbalances as contributing to the financial crisis, 
and emerging from the crisis with more balanced global growth has become a top G-20 agenda item. 
Success in implementing the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth will have a signif-
icant impact on the world’s energy and environmental future. The same economic imbalances that helped 
give rise to the crisis accelerated unsustainable patterns of global demand. Deficit countries built large 
homes and bought large cars fueled by cheap credit, increasing household energy consumption.  Surplus 
countries overinvested in energy-intensive heavy industry and pursued an excessively resource-dependent 
pattern of urbanization and growth. Whereas the energy intensity of global economic growth decreased 
by 1.1 percent per year, on average, between 1971 and 2001, between 2001 and 2008, it decreased by less 
than half that amount due in large part to global imbalances (IEA 2010d).
recommendations
The G-20 has asked the IMF for assistance in reviewing the policies of member countries in terms of their 
relationship to each other and consistency in achieving the G-20’s balanced growth objectives. In Seoul, 
the G-20 should expand this effort to analysis of the energy and environmental impact of G-20 countries’ 
macroeconomic policies, both individually and when combined with G-20 country policies as a whole. 
The IMF could enlist the IEA’s analytical support in this exercise and provide a joint report to the G-20 at 
the 2011 summit. This would not only help build political support for the rebalancing agenda but it also 
highlight the most effective rebalancing policies from an energy and environmental perspective. 
conclusIon
While the G-20 may appear to be an attractive alternative to the unwieldy UNFCCC process for 
advancing international cooperation on climate change, it is certainly no silver bullet for unlocking climate 
talks. Vulnerable countries would need to be represented in some capacity at the G-20 for any agreement 
to have any credibility outside the group, and the climate agenda would need to be approached in a 
balanced manner (e.g., giving equal attention to transparency and climate finance) to avoid inadvertently 
hampering progress in official climate talks.  Even if the G-20 were able to meet these two tests, the group 
is unlikely to be able to achieve a breakthrough on the most important issues in the negotiations at present 
because of stark differences in the positions of G-20 countries and the state of domestic policy in some key 15
countries. While there may well be a time when a leaders’ process like the G-20 is exactly what’s needed to 
unlock climate talks, given the significance and scope of the issues at hand, that time is not now.
There is much, however, that the G-20 can do to contribute to the goals of the climate change 
negotiations outside of wading into the negotiations themselves. Building on its existing agenda the  
G-20 has the power to significantly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, accelerate the deployment of 
clean energy technology, and help vulnerable countries adapt to a warmer world through the mobilization 
of public and private finance. Following through on the existing G-20 pledge to phase out and rationalize 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, establishing new green guidelines for multilateral development banks, 
coordinating green stimulus exit strategies, promoting open markets for environmental goods and 
services, and rebalancing global economic growth all fall well within the G-20’s mandate and help meet 
the climate challenge. 
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(tons of CO2e 
per person)
Argentina No 349.5 38.7 9.0
Australia Yes 559.0 20.4 27.4
Brazil No 2,841.9 186.8 15.2
Canada Yes 803.8 32.3 24.9
China No 7,187.0 1,304.5 5.5
European Union Yes 5,049.2 490.0 10.3
France Yes 548.6 61.4 8.9
Germany Yes 975.2 82.4 11.8
Italy Yes 562.4 58.9 9.5
United Kingdom Yes 645.3 60.6 10.6
India No 1,866.1 1,094.6 1.7
Indonesia No 2,041.9 220.6 9.3
Japan Yes 1,356.2 127.8 10.6
Korea No 568.7 48.3 11.8
Mexico No 683.4 103.1 6.6
Russia Yes 2,005.4 143.2 14.0
Saudi Arabia No 376.6 23.1 16.3
South Africa No 422.8 46.9 9.0
Turkey No 424.6 72.1 5.9
United States Yes 6,814.3 296.5 23.0
G-20 total 36,081.9 4,512.1 8.0
Global total 43,189.8 6,538.2 6.6
Note: Emissions include land-use change.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































figure 1     International energy Agency member energy r&d budgets,  1974–2009











































Source:  IEA (2010c).
Total energy R&D budget
Clean energy subtotal